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Civil Rights-ARREST

RECORD AS BASIS FOR JOB DENIAL HELD

CRIMINATORY-Gregory v. Litton Systems,

Dis-

Inc.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' provides that it is an unlawful
employment practice to discriminate in hiring because of an individual's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The purpose of this title is to
eliminate discrimination in the labor market so as to afford persons with
the ability to perform work and earn their livings the opportunity to do so
without penalty because of one of these factors. 2
Tide VII has received its most difficult test in cases where employers
have refused jobs to applicants on the basis of clearly stated, apparently
neutral,' policy requirements which are not manifestly predicated upon
one of the five categories enumerated in the statute,- but which are dependent upon requirements which the applicant is presently unable to fulfill because of pre-Act discrimination.' In this type of civil rights action
the definition of discrimination is especially crucial, yet the term is not
defined anywhere in the Tide.6 Traditionally the definition has required
142 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1964):

It

shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
2
See generally U.S. CODE CONa. & ADMIN. NEws 2355 (1964); Affeldt, Title VII in
the Federal Courts-Private or Public Law, 14 VIL. L. Rrv. 664 (1969), which states:
It [Title VIII is the most important tide in the Act because by protecting job
status it protects a basic value which is the key to all other political and civil
rights.

Id.3

See generally Cooper and Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment
Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv.
L. REv. 1598 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cooper and Sobol].
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1964).
5
See, e.g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 399 U.S. 926
(1970) coimnented on in 5 U. RicH. L. Rev. 157 (1970). United States v. Sheet Metal
Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Papermakers Local 189 v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505
(ED. Va. 1968). See also 110 CONG. Rxc. 7212 (1964) (Clark-Case Interpretative
Memorandum).
S42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -15 (1964).
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an intention' to exclude persons from employment because of their race.'
One line of cases, however, has diluted the intention element where the
present unequal impact on Negroes is a continuation of the employer's
own past racially discriminatory practices. These courts have looked to the
defendant's past conduct as evidence of present discrimination and have
held that the employer has a duty to mitigate the present effects of his own
acts.'
The District Court in Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc."° took this propo-

sition one step further by adopting a definition of discrimination which
does not require proof of an intention to discriminate so long as a disproportionate effect upon Negroes is foreseeable." In addition the court
applied this definition to a situation wherein the plaintiff's present inability
to fulfill the requirement was not a result or continuation of any prior
discriminatory practice of the defendant.
The plaintiff, a Negro, applied to the defendant for employment as a
sheet metal mechanic. The defendant offered him the job and he accepted.
However, the defendant had a policy which required newly-hired employees to complete a "Preliminary Security Information"" sheet. If this
7 See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970); Richards v.
Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969); 110 CoNG. REc. 14270 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey). But see Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp.
603, 607 (E.D. La. 1969); Affeldt, Title VII in the Federal Courts-Private or Public
Law, 15 ViLL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Affeldt].
8 See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970) (religion);
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S.
960 (1970) (sex); Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781 (ED. La. 1967)
(sex); M. SovERN, LEGAL REsTRAINTs oN RAcI. DISCRIMINATION i EMPLOYMENT 71
(1966). See also Note, An Additional Job Qualification, Other Than One of the
Categories in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Results in a Holding of
Nondiscrimination on the Part of the Employer, 7 Housroz; L. REv. 494 (1970).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1970); Culpepper
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sheet Metal
Vorkers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Papermakers Local 189 v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination,
and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1260 (1967).
10 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
11 The court stated that if the discrimination were accidental or inadvertent, there
would be no violation. Id. at 403.
However, since the discrimination must be because of race it is difficult to visualize
how it could ever be accidental. See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and
the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1260, 1277 (1967).
12National security regulations were not involved so as to bring the case under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g) (1964).
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sheet revealed that the employee had been arrested "a number of times,"'"
the offer of employment would be withdrawn. The plaintiff had a record
of fourteen arrests for other than minor traffic violations, but had no convictions. 4 When the defendant learned this, it withdrew the offer of employment pursuant to its policy. The policy was enforced without reference
to race, and the offer was withdrawn solely because of the arrest record.15
Despite the equal application and the neutral appearance of the defendant's policy, the court held that it violated Title VII. The court reasoned
that since Negroes are arrested more frequently than whites, 6 the policy
had the foreseeable effect of denying jobs to disproportionate numbers of
Negroes.' The court found, as a matter of fact, that a record of arrests
without convictions is irrelevant" to job efficiency and that therefore, it did
13The court noted, but made no point of the fact that "a number of times"
had not been defined by the defendant. The court also noted that several hundred
persons with arrest records were employed by the defendant. These people, however, did not fall within the category of having been arrested a "number of times."
No breakdown was made by the court of the proportional make-up of the defendant's business, nor was there evidence or indication that whites with more
arrests were hired. Such data has been used to evidence the existence of discriminatory patterns. See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36,
416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038
(5th Cir. 1969); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 3 EPD, cited in CCH
EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 8021, at 6046 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Decision of EEOC, cited in CCH
EMPIL. PRAc. GumE 6102, at 4151 (Jan. 19, 1970).
14
Thirteen of the arrests occurred prior to 1959. The court did not state the
nature of-the charges upon which the plaintiff was arrested.
15But see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964), which provides, in part:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of any
individual as a member of a union or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion
of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if
such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled or was refused
employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason
other than discrizination on account of race. . . . (emphasis added). See also
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 (a), -2(h) (1964).
V6The court found that although Negroes comprise only 11% of the total
population they suffer 27% of the total arrests and 44% of the "suspicion arrests."
The court did not elaborate on the causes of these disproportionate numbers of
arrests. See generally REPoRT OF Tam PRESIDENr's CoM'N ON LAW ENFORCEmENT
AND ADMmsTrEAoN OF JusTicE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRME IN A FRaE SocIETY 74
(1967); Cooper and Sobol, supra note 3, at 1600.
17
There is a comparable approach in state action cases. See, e.g., Norwalk CORE
v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); Brown v. Post,
279 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. La. 1968). See also Gaston County v. United States, 395
U.S. 285 (1969); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
8
1 See Jenkins, Study of Federal Effort to End Job Bias:' A History, a Status
Report, and A Prognosis, 14 How. LJ. 259, 294 (1968). The author comments on
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not justify the disproportionate exclusion of Negroes. 9 This follows the
test announced by the Fifth Circuit20 which requires a showing that the
policy is compelled by safety or efficiency considerations. No discriminatory
motive2 ' on the part of the employer was discussed. In fact, the court held
that good faith in formulating the policy was no defense.22
The cases cited by the court in Gregory support the proposition that
the present discriminatory effects of past discrimination by the defendant
constitute a present violation of Title VII. 2 ' They are distinguishable, however, from Gregory in that the disproportionate effects in each was a perpetuation of the employer's own past discriminatory acts. 2 4 The test formusome of the situations where arrests may be relevant as a factor in the decisional
process.
19The court enjoined the defendant from obtaining or using information concerning arrest without conviction. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp.
401, 404 (C. D. Cal. 1970).
20 Once a case for discrimination has been shown, if the policy does not have
a legitimate business necessity which overrides the discrimination, a remedy is
afforded. See, e.g., Culpeper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (Sth Cir. 1970);
Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); Asbestos
Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969). But see Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1235 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 399 U.S. 926 (1970) (genuine
business
purpose test).
21
See, e.g., Broussard v. Schlumberger Well Services, 315 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.
Tex. 1970); Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 313 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Neb.
1970). See also Decision of EEOC, cited in CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
8516, at 6378
(June 18, 1969) (reason for refusal so groundless that it warranted the inference
that is was racially motivated).
22
See, e.g., United States v. Electrical Workers Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.
1970); Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1055 (5th Cir. 1969).
But cf. Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969). See also
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1) (1964) (good faith reliance on a written opinion of
the EEOC is a valid defense).
23See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969); Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969). See
also Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (past discrimination in
voting qualification tests).
24 See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
The court held that the defendant's present policies had the effect of perpetuating
his past practices and that he had a duty to mitigate these present effects. From
this past discrimination, the Court inferred present discrimination. Id. at 127.
The decision in Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1969) is also based upon the defendant's past record. Crown's plant based promotions
on a seniority system which had been operated in a discriminatory manner prior
to 1964. After 1964 the system was operated in a nondiscriminatory manner, but
promotions were still being based in part upon seniority which Negroes had been
prevented from obtaining under the old system. The court stated that even if
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lated in Gregory requires that the plaintiff merely show a disproportionate
exclusion of Negroes caused by any factor unequal between the races. 5
26
This test looks to effect rather than reason for the effect.
Though the disproportionate exclusion of minority groups may be evidence of an intention to discriminate against them,2" it should not be the
sole test of a Title VII violation.28 The court in Gregory inferred an intention to discriminate from the fact that the effect of Litton's policy on
Negroes was foreseeable." Certainly the imposition of the hiring policy
was intentional and certainly the defendant intended to exclude those
persons who had "a number of arrests." However, it does not necessarily
follow that the defendant intended to exclude persons because of their race
merely because a proportionately higher number of Negroes were excluded
by the policy. Where the exclusion is a continuation of a prior policy of
discrimination by the defendant it can be inferred that the discrimination
the defendant did not now intend to discriminate, the earlier system of discrimination was designed for that purpose and Crown could not continue to perpetuate
its effects. Id. at 986.
The court recognized that the employer has a need for qualified personnel, but
held:
When an employer or union has discriminated in the past and when its
present policies renew or exaggerate discriminatory effects, those policies
must yield, unless there is an overriding legitimate, nonracial business purpose.
Id. at 989.
25See Affeldt, supra note 7, at 3. But see Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429
F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'g, 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969). The District
Court found that the defendant's policy, though not specifically based upon religion,
had the effect of penalizing the plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit reversed on several
grounds, one being that the plaintiff had not shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was discharged because of his religion. See also Jackson v. Veri
Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. La. 1969); Decision of EEOC, cited in
CCH
EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 1 6164, at 4275 (Sept. 28, 1970).
26
See Cooper and Sobol, supra note 3, at 1671. But see M. SovNa, LEGA. RsrAiunrrs
oN RACIAL DisciumNAno
2t

IN Empr.oyxmrET,

71 (1966).

See, e.g, Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 247 (10th Cit.
1970); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 127 (8th Cir.
1969); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969). See also 110
CoNG. REc. 14270 (1964) (remarks of Sen Humphrey).
28
See, e.g., U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 2516 (1964). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(j) (1964).
2
See Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cit. 1969). The
court stated:
The requisite intent may be inferred from the fact that the defendants persisted in the conduct after its racial implications had become known to them.
Id. at 997.
This must be viewed in light of the court's earlier statement that the defendant
had a duty to undo the present effects of his past discrimination. Id. at 988.
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has not ceased, and the defendant should not be able to escape liability
solely because his present policy appears neutral. However, the decision in
Gregory disregards the employer's state of mind.
Proponents of the effect test look to the language of the statute which
states that there is a violation if the employer does any act which would
".. . in any way.., tend to deprive ... or otherwise adversely affect..."
a person's employment status or opportunity." They conclude that this
language manifests an intention to define discrimination in its broadest
terms. 1 It is submitted that this language, however, describes how much
adversity will suffice as an infringement upon the protected rights. It does
not alter the requirement that the tendency to deprive or adversely affect
be on account of race.' 2
Of course, too strict an adherence to the language "because of race"
would render the act ineffectual, and such a strict application is not consonant with Congressional intent." An amendment which would have
restricted violations to incidents where the applicant was denied the job
solely because of race was defeated by Congress.' 4 However, this does not
manifest an intention to disregard the requirement that race be a reason
for the adverse impact, since the statute unequivocally requires it."
Such apparently neutral requirements as college degrees,"6 high school
diplomas," experience,'" and seniority" have been found to discriminate
because of race. But in each case there was evidence of prior discrimination or other factors from which to infer a discriminatory motive.
The effect test coupled with the business necessity test places too much
weight upon proportional differences. Congress did not intend such an
emphasis upon statistics because of their propensity toward quotas.4 This
3042 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (1964).
31 See Affeldt, supra note 7, at 9; Cooper and Sobol, supra note 3, at 1612.
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1964).
1 See 110 CONG. REc. 13837 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Case).
34 See 110 CoNo. REc. 13838 (1964).

35 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), -5(g),-6 (1964).
36See, e.g., Decision of EEOC, cited in CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE $ 6102, at 4151
(Jan. 19, 1970).
37
See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,
399 U.S. 926 (1970), commented on in 5 U. RiH. L. REv. 157 (1970).
3
sSee, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th

Cir. 1969).
39 See, e.g., Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969);
Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
40
See U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2516 (1964).
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approach also restricts the policies over which the employer has control to
those which he can prove in courts are necessary to his business.41 This
construction goes beyond the scope of the title in that it imposes a duty on
the employer not to disproportionately exclude Negroes, whereas the clear
language of the Act only imposes a duty not to intentionally exclude persons because of their race. 2
E.D.B.

41

See Winter, Improzing the Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws Against
Discrimination: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. Gin. L. REV. 817, 834 (1967).
See42also 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).

